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Abstract 
 
 This is an overview of poverty and well-being in the first decade of post-apartheid 
South Africa. It is an introduction to a volume that brings together some of the most 
prominent academic research done on this topic for the 10-year review process in South 
Africa. This overview highlights three key aspects of the picture that the detailed research 
paints. First, data quality and comparability has been a constant issue in arriving at a 
consensus among analysts on the outcomes for households and individuals in post-
apartheid South Africa. Second, while the outcomes on unemployment, poverty and 
inequality are indeed bad, the outcomes on social indicators and access to public services 
are much more encouraging. Third, the prospects for rapid and sustained economic growth, 
without which poverty and well-being cannot be addressed in the long run, are themselves 
negatively affected by increasing inequality, poverty and unemployment. 
                                                 
§ Overview chapter of, H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (Editors), Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 2006. The authors are grateful to USAID for its support of this project through 
its collaborative agreement with Cornell University, Strategies and Analysis for Growth and Access (SAGA). 
1. Introduction 
 
 The end of the first decade of democracy in South Africa naturally resulted in a 
wide-ranging set of political events to mark this date. South Africa’s formal baptism as a 
democracy in April, 1994, received international acclaim and recognition – which to this 
day serves as a model for other countries undergoing difficult and protracted political 
transitions. However, perhaps the greater struggle since the early post-apartheid days has 
been the attempt to undo the economic vestiges of the system of racial exclusivity. 
Alongside the political evaluation and praise, therefore, there has been a vigorous local 
research programme aimed broadly at measuring the changes in well-being that occurred in 
this 10-year period. In addition, a number of studies also concentrated on measuring the 
performance of government in meeting its stated objectives of reducing poverty, inequality 
and unemployment. This volume brings together some of the core pieces of academic 
research that have been prominent in this 10-year review, focusing on the poverty and 
policy in post-apartheid South Africa1. 
 
 The "headlines" and "soundbites" of the 10-year review are by now well known – 
the first ten years have seen rising unemployment, rising income poverty, and rising 
income inequality, all in the context of a lacklustre performance in economic growth. The 
papers in this volume present the detailed and nuanced analysis that underlies these 
headlines. In this overview we highlight three key aspects of the picture that the detailed 
research paints. First, data quality and comparability has been a constant issue in arriving at 
a consensus among analysts on the outcomes for households and individuals in post-
apartheid South Africa. Second, while the outcomes on unemployment, poverty and 
inequality are indeed bad, the outcomes on social indicators and access to public services 
are much more encouraging. Third, the prospects for rapid and sustained economic growth, 
without which poverty and well-being cannot be addressed in the long run, are themselves 
negatively affected by increasing inequality, poverty and unemployment. Sections 2, 3 and 
4 below take up each of these points in turn. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Debate 
 
 The most obvious starting point for a 10-year review research programme would be 
to ascertain what the nature of shifts has been in a composite set of key welfare indicators. 
While the key contributions within this arena are captured in this volume, underlying these 
outputs are critical issues related to the choice of data, data quality and data coverage. 
These collectively, as we enunciate below, are important for scholarly purposes but also 
critical as accurate inputs into the policy formulation process in South Africa. 
 
 The World Bank-sponsored 1993 Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) 
for South Africa, undertaken by a local research unit2, provided the first nationally 
representative micro-dataset to South Africa on the cusp of its new democracy.  Since 
                                                 
1 The state, through the Presidency of South Africa, did prepare its own 10-year review, which in fact drew 
directly or indirectly on many of the findings presented in this book (The Presidency, 2003). 
2 The research unit that undertook the survey was the Southern Africa Labour & Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) and the survey has in fact come to be known as the SALDRU 1993 data set. 
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1995, however, there has been a steady flow of micro-datasets, differing in focus and 
coverage. These datasets range from household surveys (1995-1999) and Censuses (1996 
& 2001) to income and expenditure (1995 & 2000) and bi-annual labour force surveys 
(2000 onwards), all of which are nationally representative and run under the auspices of the 
national statistical agency – Statistics South Africa (StatsSA). These datasets have served 
as the bedrock for undertaking much of the analytical work around welfare shifts in the 
post-apartheid period. In this way, this data will continue to be an important source of 
reference for any re-examination of the country’s first 10 years of democratic rule. 
 
 Given the political impact of any analytical work directly or indirectly assessing 
South Africa’s performance since 1994, the role of data quality and ensuring that the data 
was not contaminated in any form, took on a particular relevance. This, indeed, has been 
the undertone of much of the research, and consequent debate, that has ensued around the 
income poverty and inequality shifts reported for the post-apartheid period (Meth, 2006). 
The two key pieces in this literature have been extremely careful and transparent 
concerning data problems (Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006 and Leibbrandt et al., 2006).  
 
 The two sets of data available for measuring poverty and inequality shifts since 
1994 are the Income & Expenditure Surveys (IESs) of 1995 and 2000 and the Census of 
1996 and 2001. Both are equally valid sources of data, but implicitly allow for some 
semblance of a corroboration of results. In both sets issues of data quality have loomed 
large (see Cronje & Budlender, 2004; Simkins, 2003 and Meth, 2006). These have included 
in the IESs, the lack of price data, the exclusion of home-grown products in consumption 
and significant problems with sampling weights. The Census data are particularly 
problematic, for example, with regard to large numbers of zero and missing income 
variables. The latter in turn was reported in bands, making a comparison over time a 
fraught exercise. 
 
 Perhaps the most vivid example of the importance of data quality lies in the national 
debate around ‘jobless growth’ (Bhorat, 2004; Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2006; Casale, Muller 
& Posel, 2004 and Meth, 2006).  It was widely held in political, public sector and media 
debates that the South African economy had steadily shed jobs, despite positive economic 
growth, since 1994. The catchphrase for this claim was ‘jobless growth’ and it became a 
powerful epithet for reflecting on the general inability of the domestic economy to create 
jobs. Closer analysis, however, revealed that this notion of ‘jobless growth’ was reliant on a 
single and, as it turns out, wholly incomplete, data set (Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2006). The 
data set, the Standardised Employment and Earnings (SEE) series excludes large swathes 
of economic activity, and in so doing misrepresents aggregate employment in South Africa. 
As a consequence, reliance on this data, revealed a steady decline in employment from the 
mid-1990s in South Africa. This result, when tested against the more reliant household and 
labour force survey data, has since been shown to be fundamentally flawed – with 
employment in fact expanding in the post-1994 period.  
 
 Whilst many of these issues and their resolutions are now common to the literature, 
there are a number of important lessons that arise from these various data de-contamination 
exercises.  Firstly, the data cleaning exercise during this 10-year review process brings into 
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sharp relief the importance of ‘getting the numbers right’.  For a national and international 
community intensely interested in how the country has fared in its first decade of 
democracy, accurate figures on poverty, inequality and unemployment hold a particular 
policy relevance.  Incorrect results, for example as was the case with the ‘jobless growth’ 
numbers, can have significant political ramifications. Secondly, it needs to be accepted that 
the income poverty and inequality shifts, undertaken within the spirit of the 10-year review 
process, are not in fact a representation of the first decade of democracy. In covering the 
period 1995-2000 or 1996-2001 depending on the data sets used, these results obviously 
cover an incomplete time period. The non-availability of more recent data sets of course 
forced this time period choice. What this reflects, however, is the importance of trading off 
imperfect data against the prevalent policy imperatives. The latter was clearly to gain, as 
best as was possible, an understanding of welfare shifts in the post-apartheid period. 
Thirdly, the problems the research community have experienced with data delivered by the 
national statistical agency, whilst resulting in often fractious engagements, has opened up a 
portal of information-sharing. In so doing, the research community are able to feed back 
their concerns around data to the national statistical body – and this alone means that the 
process of data verification remains policy relevant. Fourthly, South Africa has also since 
1994 seen the proliferation of a number of smaller, regional and unofficial surveys. These 
include most notably the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Survey (KIDS), which is a 
panel tracking households in this province (May, 2006) and more recently, the Cape Area 
Panel Survey. These data sets should remain an important source for corroborating national 
results and furthermore as a tool for extracting more nuanced information on poverty, 
inequality and labour market issues in South Africa. 
 
3. Outcomes: Incomes, Unemployment and Social Indicators 
 
Mindful of the hard questions that have been asked of the data, and the fact that data 
availability in most instances prevent an analysis of trends that is true to the full decade of 
democracy – what then are some of the more important shifts we have witnessed under the 
guidance of the new government? 
 
There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that income poverty increased. The headcount 
index has increased nationally from 32 to 34 per cent between 1995 and 2000 or, using a 
different dataset, from 26 to 28 per cent between 1996 and 2001 on a $2 a day poverty line 
(Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006; Leibbrandt & Levinsohn, 2005 and Leibbrandt et al., 2006). 
The increase is still seen when measured using the broader FGT class of poverty measures 
(Foster, Greer, Thorbecke, 1984), which give weight to the depth of poverty as well as to 
the number of the poor. Hence, over the 1995-2000 period, we find that for any realistic 
poverty line, the headcount index and the poverty gap measure shows significant increases 
nationally (Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006).  For example, on a poverty line of $2 a day, the 
mean poor household earned 11 per cent below this line in 1995 and by 2000 this had 
increased to 13 per cent.  
 
 The data by race is particularly revealing:  Between 1995 and 2000, absolute and 
relative poverty levels amongst African-headed households increased, while for non-
African households it either remained stagnant or declined. While the inter-Censal analysis 
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also reveals an overall increase in the headcount and poverty gap measures, this result is 
not restricted to African-headed households. Hence, the 1996-2001 Census data analysis 
suggests that both absolute and relative poverty levels increased for African, Coloured and 
(at the higher poverty line) Asian households.  Indeed, while Coloured headcount poverty 
declines from 20 to 12 per cent in the 1995-2000 comparison, it increases from 10 to 13 per 
cent in the inter-Censal comparison. The availability of future datasets would ensure a test 
of both these results for the Coloured population (Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006; Leibbrandt et 
al., 2006). 
 
 One of the more important results within this exercise lies in the spatial dimensions 
of poverty. Both a 1995-2000 or inter-Censal comparison indicate a rise in rural and urban 
household poverty. For example, the proportion of urban (rural) households classified as 
poor increased from 13 (45) to 16 per cent (46 per cent), on a $2 a day poverty line, 
between 1996 and 2001 (Leibbrandt et al., 2006). Importantly, however, the share of the 
rural poor in overall poverty is declining:  Thus while the rural poor accounted for 62 per 
cent of all poor households in 1996, five years later this had declined to 56 per cent. This 
suggests a rapid process of urban migration that could in the future reshape the spatial 
nature of poverty in South Africa. Indeed, more specific numbers on migrant workers 
indicates that the incidence of migrant (or sending) households in rural areas increased 
from about 1.2 to 1.5 million households (Posel & Casale, 2006). This role of space in 
reinforcing or potentially overcoming South Africa’s welfare challenges is likely to feature 
increasingly in future policy debates. The process of fairly rapid urbanisation from poorer 
to richer provinces is now beginning to be documented (Oosthuizen & Naidoo, 2004) – and 
it is evident that this presents new challenges for wealthier provinces and their cities One 
very specific example of these challenges is a study on recent migrants to the city of Cape 
Town. Results here show that, controlling for individual and household characteristics, 
recent rural migrants to the city stand a lower probability of finding employment in the 
city, relative to non-migrants (Rospabé & Selod, 2006). 
 
 Income inequality has also increased with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.565 to 
0.577 between 1995 and 2000, while on a 1996 and 2001 comparison the Gini rose from 
0.68 to 0.73 (Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006; Leibbrandt & Levinsohn, 2005  and Leibbrandt et 
al., 2006).  Aside from the national Gini coefficients increasing in both sets of data, there is 
also Lorenz-dominance in the time comparisons, ensuring that this increase is unambiguous 
(Leibbrandt et al., 2006).  The Gini coefficient has risen consistently across all race groups 
in the inter-Censal comparison, although noticeably declines for Asians and Whites when 
using the IES data. Urban and rural inequality has also risen. What is also interesting are 
the measures of between- and within-group inequality using the sub-group decomposable 
Theil Index. It has always been argued that between-group inequality has been a key facet 
of understanding income inequality in South Africa. Hence, the contribution of between-
group inequality to overall inequality in South Africa stood at about 60 per cent in the 
1970s (Whiteford & van Seventer, 2000). In 1996, using the Census estimates the share of 
between-group inequality had declined to 43 per cent, and by 2001, this figure was 40 per 
cent. Put differently, while the key fault-line in income inequality terms, that of the 
African-White income differential was being eroded, this has been replaced by a significant 
growth in within-group income inequality. This share of within-group inequality has 
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increased by some 20 percentage points over the last three decades in South Africa. 
Specifically, the overall driver of income inequality in post-apartheid South Africa 
continues to be the rising inequality amongst African households.  
 
 Whilst these national data sets are extremely useful for static comparative exercises, 
the one significant disadvantage is that they are unable to reflect on patterns of income 
mobility. The KIDS data set is a panel and hence allows for fairly nuanced, albeit 
geographically restricted, analysis of income mobility. Applying transition matrices on this 
data, results indicate that about one-third of those households who were poor in 1993, were 
non-poor in 1998, thus representing those in transitory poverty (May, 2006). Equally 
important is the result for those households just above the poverty line in 1993:  by 1998 
about 50 per cent of these households had fallen back into poverty (May, 2006). Indeed, 
while it is important to emphasise the significance of transitions into and out of poverty 
amongst South African households, the results also make it clear that the initial level of 
household income and wealth, which can in part be proxied by a variety of labour market 
indicators, is a significant predictor of movement out of poverty (May, 2006; Cichello, 
Fields & Leibbrandt, 2005). 
 
 Changes in the labour market remain possibly the key transmission mechanism for 
understanding the shifts in income poverty and inequality. Labour market developments, in 
turn, indicate a significant increase in the unemployment rate irrespective of the definition 
used:   The broad unemployment rate increased from 31 to 42 per cent, while narrow 
unemployment rates rose from 18 to 31 per cent (Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2006). Hence, the 
data for South Africa on employment and unemployment trends appear to strongly 
reinforce the income trends noted above. The data shows that over the period 1995-2002, 
aggregate employment grew by some 1.5 million jobs, at an average rate of 2.3 per cent per 
annum. This remains slightly below the economic growth rate over the period. In turn, 
however, the labour force grew by some 5.2 million individuals, resulting in a massive rise 
in the national unemployment levels from 4.2 million in 1995 to close to 8 million in 2002 
(Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2006). Thus, while the economy did not experience ‘jobless growth’ 
in the post-apartheid period, employment absorption was sufficiently poor to result in 
rising unemployment rates for all races and both sexes. In turn, these labour market shifts 
reflect a continued trend of skills-biased labour demand needs as the share of skilled and 
semi-skilled workers continued to rise in the post-apartheid period. Other studies have also 
reported the worrying spectre of sharply rising graduate unemployment, driven by the 
qualities and type of tertiary qualifications being accumulated by individuals (Bhorat, 
2004). 
 
 The above headline results dominate much of the policy discourse around the shifts 
in social and economic indicators since April 1994. The rise in income deprivation or 
income maldistribution – measured differentially by the Gini coefficient, the headcount 
index and the unemployment rate – is undoubted. This should not, however, mask some 
important movements in access to public services and in social indicators. These shifts are 
worthy of their own headlines. The post-1994 era is notable for the rapid reallocation of 
resources through the fiscus, from rich, White households to poor, African households. 
Broadly, while approximately 40 per cent of aggregate social spending was directed to 
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Whites and 43 per cent to Africans in the mid-1980s, by the late 1990s fully 80 per cent of 
total social spending was assigned to the African populace and less than 10 per cent to 
Whites (van der Berg, 2006). The results of this fiscal switch are evident in the data on 
assets and services. Hence, the share of households with access to piped water increased 
from 80 to 85 per cent between 1996 and 2001 – with similar gains reported for related 
sanitation services (Bhorat, Poswell & Naidoo, 2004). The share of households with access 
to electricity for lighting and cooking has shown particularly spectacular gains. For 
example, between 1996 and 2001, the share of African households with access to electricity 
for lighting increased from 44 to 62 per cent (Leibbrandt et al., 2006).  While less 
significant, improvements in local government services (principally refuse removal) were 
also reported. 
 
 There has thus been a remarkable shift of fiscal resources toward poor households 
in post-apartheid South Africa. There are three key issues within this overall fiscal 
reallocation:  Firstly, the magnitude of the shifts is important to understand, and are 
particularly interesting, given that over the same period government had managed to reduce 
its deficit-to-GDP ratio. Secondly, the incidence of the shift is important, and the extent to 
which it was biased toward the poor is necessary to analyse. Finally, aside from the shift in 
resources, we need to be sure that it has resulted in the intended outcomes. 
 
 In terms of aggregate shifts, social service expenditure (encompassing spending on 
education, health, housing and social security) increased from 12 to 17 per cent of GDP 
between 1993 and 2003. Proportionately, the largest increases were recorded for housing 
and social security, where expenditure (as a share of GDP) increased by 40 and 92 per cent 
respectively (National Treasury, 2004).  Government spending on water schemes and 
services also increased dramatically – from R847 million per annum in 1993 to R4 445 
million in 2003 – a 76 per cent rise over the decade. Put differently, real per capita social 
expenditure (including water service provision) stood at R2170 per person in 1983. By 
2003, this figure was R3 451 per person, which represents close to a 60 per cent increase in 
total social spending. It should be clear then that a dramatic fiscal reallocation process took 
place in the post-apartheid era. Driven by a need to overcome severe backlogs in these 
different spheres, there was a sharp refocusing of expenditure towards potentially poverty-
alleviating assets and services.   
 
 The second issue – the extent to which this redirection of expenditure did in fact 
reach its intended beneficiaries – is of course the domain of fiscal incidence analysis. 
Evidence indicates a consistent shift in expenditure toward poorer households. Between 
1995 and 2000, per capita social spending increased by between 21 and 38 per cent for the 
1st and 2nd deciles. In turn, social spending declined on a per capita basis by 9 per cent (6 
per cent) for the 9th (10th) decile (van der Berg, 2005). By race, per capital social spending 
on Africans increased by 20 per cent between 1995 and 2000, while it declined for all other 
race groups (van der Berg, 2005) Allocation to rural areas increased by over 30 per cent, 
while that for urban areas declined.  Summary measures of expenditure indicate that 
spending on education (particularly school and less so for tertiary education), health, 
housing and water are equity-enhancing, while that on social security is strongly equity-
enhancing (van der Berg, 2006). On the latter for example, the introduction of a new state 
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transfer, the child support grant, together with very high take-up rates in existing social 
grants – most notably the old age pension – has made the state’s social security provision 
the most effective anti-poverty intervention. Of total social security expenditure, in 2000, 
61 per cent was allocated to individuals in the 1st and 2nd deciles (van der Berg, 2006). 
 
 Given this clear pro-poor orientation of fiscal expenditure, the outcomes that this 
has engendered are also important to capture. In the case of services – principally water, 
sanitation and electricity – the results point to a widening of access to vulnerable 
households.  Relatively new work in the area has analysed the shift in entitlement 
deprivation over the 1993-2004 period (Naidoo & van der Westhuizen, 2005). Applying 
the growth incidence curve methodology to these shifts, the results indicate absolute and 
relative pro-poor growth in access to services and assets, when measured against per capita 
household expenditure. For example, access to formal housing grew by 42 and 34 per cent 
for deciles 1 and 2 between 1993 and 2004, and 21 and 16 per cent for deciles 3 and 4. 
Access to piped water increased by 187 per cent over this period, while the growth was 31 
per cent in the 4th decile. Finally, a reflection of possibly the most successful of these 
interventions, access to electricity for lighting expanded by 578 per cent for the poorest 
decile and 286 per cent for the 2nd poorest decile.  
 
 In terms of state provision of education, panel data indicates that it remains the most 
important asset to extract households out of poverty (May, 2006) and the resource shift in 
this sense is extremely positive. However, more detailed evidence on the specific 
earmarking of this expanded budget, indicates that much of the funds went toward 
increasing teacher salaries (Fiske & Ladd, 2005).  For example, expenditure per learner 
increased from R2 222 to R3 253 between 1995 and 2001, while over the same period, 
learner-educator ratios remained constant at 30:1 (Fiske & Ladd, 2005). 
 
 Ultimately, though, the above analysis of welfare shifts in the post-apartheid period 
point to three important lessons. Firstly, that any exhaustive analysis of changes in 
household and individual well-being should also account for non-income measures of 
deprivation. As a consequence, a true appreciation of the shifts that have occurred in the 
post-apartheid period can only be derived through comparing and contrasting movements 
in income, assets and services available to the poor. Secondly, the importance of this 
comparative exercise is magnified in the context here, given that these non-income 
measures – measures of Sen’s entitlement deprivation – have in fact moved counter to the 
standard income metrics of vulnerability.  An objective assessment of whether poverty, 
measured multi-dimensionally, has in fact increased is not possible to determine for the 
post-apartheid period. New methods that have recently been designed to undertake such 
exercises (Duclos, Sahn & Younger, 2005), would appear to be the next step in the 
country’s domestic research programme. Finally, it should be kept in mind that increased 
expenditure allocations, independent of income poverty and inequality shifts, are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for welfare improvements. In addition to the example 
of education outlays noted above, prices are an important predictor of welfare outcomes. 
Hence, recent evidence has indicated that the key drivers of aggregate inflation in the 1998-
2002 period for poor urban households have been public services including water, 
electricity, transport and sanitation services (Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2006b).  The provision 
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of the asset or service therefore, remains only a first step in ensuring that vulnerable 
households are sufficiently empowered to extricate themselves from permanent or 
transitory poverty. 
 
4. Policy-Growth and Distribution 
 
All of the trends in income and non-income measures of well-being have played out against 
the backdrop of poor overall economic growth performance by the South African economy. 
Economic growth rates since 1994 have been modest, with the highest recorded being 4.3 
per cent in 1996. Furthermore, the trend over this short period, has been downward until 
1999, and then a leveling off to a range between 2 and 4 per cent since 2000.  Importantly 
though, the pre-1994 period was characterised by negative growth rates, and since the 
advent of democracy, growth while in absolute terms remaining insufficient, averaged of 
about 3 per cent over the decade.  The positive, yet tepid growth rates are manifest in the 
fact that over the 1994-2003 period, the mean population growth rate was over 2 per cent, 
resulting in a real per capita GDP growth rate of 0.9 per cent over the period. In addition, 
data available for middle income and low middle income countries from the World Bank, 
indicates that the mean growth rates for these composite countries for the period 1999 to 
2003, were above that for South Africa over the same period3 (World Bank, 2005). There 
can be no doubt therefore, that the economy, since 1994, has remained in a low-level 
growth cycle.  
 
 It is widely accepted that consistent and high levels of economic growth will, 
holding income inequality constant, reduce levels of income poverty in a society (Dollar & 
Kraay, 2002; Ravallion & Chen, 2003; Kanbur, 2005). This has of course been the implicit 
approach taken by policy authorities in the post-apartheid South Africa:  namely the notion 
that multitude of policy interventions being pursued across all national government 
departments are simultaneously designed to place the economy onto a significantly higher 
growth trajectory. 
 
 With this in mind, a burgeoning research agenda in South Africa is being focused 
on understanding the constraints on long-run growth. These can be categorised into a 
number of broad determining factors, which thematically include:  the role of the labour 
market in growth; trade liberalisation; domestic market inefficiencies and the importance of 
social ills, specifically HIV/AIDS and crime. We now consider each of these elements 
briefly, within the context of the extent to which they may act as a constraint on long-run 
growth. 
 
 The role of the labour market in constraining economic growth can be broadly cast 
into three key concerns. The first is the role of labour legislation in hindering growth in 
domestic investment and hence employment creation. The second is South Africa’s well-
known skills mismatch – a high demand for skilled labour co-existing with an excess 
supply of unskilled labour – and its relationship to domestic economic growth. The third 
issue is the highly contentious  wage-employment trade-off. 
                                                 
3 Specifically the middle income aggregate average growth rate was 3.7 per cent per annum while that for low 
middle income economies was 4.8 per cent per annum. 
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 Firm survey evidence, based on the perception of employers, have indicated fairly 
consistently that they view employment constraints as partly operating through the labour 
regulatory environment. Secondly, within this regulatory framework, dismissal clauses in 
the amended Labour Relations Act of 2002 are viewed as particularly inimical to 
employment creation, production costs and productivity levels  (Bhorat, 2005; Chandra, 
2000; Rankin, 2005). One objective measure of these costs indicates that the dismissal 
costs for labourers, as a ratio of own-mean wage, is three times that of managers (Bhorat, 
2005).  Within the regulatory environment, there remain significant concerns around the 
extent to which South Africa’s workplace grievance institution – the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) – has perhaps contributed to increased 
inefficiency within the labour market through a combination of  having to adhere to 
specific regulatory provisions; its own internal procedural machinations and finally, general 
resource constraints particularly relating to the shortage of skilled personnel (Benjamin & 
Gruen, 2005; Cheadle, 2005). Compounding this, is the view that much of the legislation is 
biased against small businesses, purely by virtue of their inability to meet a myriad of 
requirements in the legislation – the so-called ‘procedural burden’ inherent in South 
Africa’s regulatory environment (Small Business Project, 2005). 
 
  In terms of South Africa’s skills shortage, the rise in the demand for highly skilled 
workers has been well documented for South Africa (Bhorat & Hodge, 1999; Edwards, 
2001), and the extent to which it acts as a constraint on the productivity levels of firms has 
also been shown (Chandra, 2000). Also related, however, is the fact that this shortage of 
high-level human capital has hindered growth in fixed investment through constraining 
new investments in R & D in higher educational institutions (Fedderke, 2006; Fedderke, de 
Kadt & Luiz, 2003).  In addition, there continues to be skilled immigration legislation that 
is not entirely suited to an economy such as South Africa’s with a chronic skills shortage. 
 
 Finally, the contentious issue of the wage-employment trade-off continues to be the 
subject of debate in South Africa. Estimates of South Africa’s long-run wage elasticity of 
employment have been consistently negative and less than unity and at the aggregate level 
ranging from -0.5 to -0.7 (Bowles & Heintz, 1996; Fallon & Lucas, 1998; Fields, 
Leibbrandt & Wakeford, 1999).  With different specifications and according to skill 
classes, the elasticity can rise to as much as -2.23 (Fedderke, 2006). There would seem to 
be two issues here. The first is that, while the wage-employment trade-off cannot be 
doubted, the link between wages and household poverty still requires further analytical 
refinement. Hence, it is not clear whether wage increases will ultimately reduce levels of 
household poverty in the society. Although we now have an analytical framework to lean 
on (Fields & Kanbur, 2005), this is a new line of enquiry critical to taking this debate 
forward. Secondly, independent of the veracity of the elasticity estimates, there remains a 
very powerful political economy fact:  that wage repression of whatever scale and intensity 
in South Africa’s highly unionised environment is a recipe for potentially severe social and 
political instability. This fact should never be discounted when considering the policy 
implications of pursuing a policy of mandated real wage reductions. 
 
 South Africa embarked on a process of trade liberalisation in the mid-1980s, 
intensifying considerably in the post-apartheid period under World Trade Organisation 
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commitments. There was therefore a significant reduction in average tariff rates, combined 
with a simplification of the tariff structure (Cassim et al., 2002; Edwards, 2006). Evidence, 
in turn, indicates that this liberalisation process has resulted in a twin process of a growth in 
exports and increased import penetration ratios. Furthermore, studies have shown that 
increased trade over time in South Africa is significantly associated with a growth in total 
factor productivity, with little evidence, if any, of de-industrialisation (Cassim et al., 2002; 
Tsikata, 1999). The debate within South Africa in the post-apartheid period, on trade 
reform, has also, however, focused on the labour market effects of reducing these 
distortions. Tariff reduction seems to have been disproportionately applied to labour-
intensive sectors, with the growth in net trade in the post-1994 period biased strongly in 
favour of skill-intensive sectors (Edwards, 2006). However, a more detailed decomposition 
exercise, designed to measure the sources of employment growth in the post-apartheid 
period finds a small positive effect on employment from net trade, with much of the 
employment losses in the formal sector attributable to technological change (Edwards, 
2006). Perhaps one of the key determinants of trade performance in the first decade of 
democracy has been the exchange rate. There has been significant increase in the volatility 
of the real effective exchange rate since 1994, which has resulted in considerable 
uncertainty amongst exporters (Cassim et al., 2002). Given that monetary policy is now 
guided by inflation targeting, the exchange rate has ceased to be a nominal anchor and, 
hence, the search for a stable and competitive exchange rate becomes a key variable for 
export competitiveness in the future. 
 
 Influenced by high levels of concentration in the South African economy, there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that this has resulted in mark-ups that are significantly higher 
in South Africa than comparable international evidence suggests (Fedderke, 2006). These 
mark-ups are as high as 80 per cent within the domestic manufacturing sector, with the US 
manufacturing data indicating a mark-up of about 45 per cent (Fedderke, 2006). In 
addition, evidence for the banking sector suggests that the margins here are high by 
international standards – and at twice those for European banks (Okeahalam, 2002). One 
consequence of these high margins in the banking sector has been to act as a constraint on 
the growth of small businesses in South Africa (Berry et al., 2002). Within this context 
then, the role of greater import competition and competition policy is enhanced. A 
combination of the two would ultimately result in reducing concentration levels in 
domestic industries, thereby not only inducing enhanced consumer welfare but also greater 
domestic and international competitiveness. 
 
 The role of institutions and governance in economic growth is clearly an important 
determinant of long-run growth. The literature on the subject in South Africa in the post-
apartheid period is unfortunately relatively thin, with a few exceptions (Fedderke, 2006). 
Hence, while we are aware that issues of corruption, contract enforcement, the perception 
of the legal system and political certainty are key, little formal empirical evidence presently 
exists to isolate its importance as a constraint on growth. Two significant areas of 
uncertainty, though, are obvious and deserve attention here, namely the extraordinary high 
levels of crime in South Africa combined with the country’s very high incidence of 
HIV/AIDS. 
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 South Africa’s incidence of both violent and non-violent criminal activity remains 
one of the highest in the world (Demombynes & Özler, 2006). Firm survey evidence also 
indicates that employers view crime and theft as the most important constraint on firm 
growth (Rankin, 2005). Apart from the uncertainty generated by these high levels of crime, 
thereby impeding long-run growth, it is also clear that it significantly increases the 
operating costs of firms. In addition, it is a key contributor to skilled labour emigration. 
The fortunes of income inequality and criminal activity are also closely intertwined. Micro 
evidence suggests that high levels of income inequality, particularly within-group 
inequality, are a significant and positive determinant of the incidence of burglary and 
vehicle theft as well as violent crime (Demombynes & Özler, 2006). Ultimately, there 
exists a vicious triangle which links income inequality to crime which, in turn, induces high 
levels of investment uncertainty. This acts as possibly one of the key constraints to long-
run economic growth in South Africa. 
 
 South Africa’s HIV/AIDS prevalence remains one of the highest in the world. 
Estimates suggest that the prevalence amongst adults aged 15-49 was 21.5 per cent in 2003.  
This compares with a global average of 1.1 per cent and a mean of 7.5 per cent for Sub-
Saharan Africa (UNAIDS, 2004). In addition, the pandemic has disproportionately struck 
young, economically active adults as well as those categorised as semi-skilled or unskilled 
(Arndt & Lewis, 2002). The pandemic’s impact on long-run growth operates through a 
multitude of channels. These include, for example, declining productivity amongst the 
infected employed, increased pressure on health and other social services as the pandemic 
matures, reduced investment expenditure and savings in households treating infected 
individuals and so on. Over a 10-year horizon, modeling exercises estimate that per capita 
GDP is likely to be on average 8 per cent lower, given the impact of the pandemic (Arndt 
& Lewis, 2002). Estimates of the impact on long-run growth indicate that the pandemic 
may result in a 0.5 to 1 per cent reduction in real GDP per annum (Arndt & Lewis, 2002; 
Bureau for Economic Research, 2001).  
 
 The above then has provided a quick, and by no means exhaustive, tour of some of 
key constraints on long-run growth in South Africa. While steady progress is being made 
on some of these fronts, notably within the area of deregulating domestic markets and trade 
liberalisation, there has been a fair degree of policy inertia. The latter is particularly true in 
the case of crime and the HIV/AIDS pandemic which, given their powerful impact on 
investment and uncertainty, suggests some redirection of state commitment to focusing on 
these binding constraints on growth. Within the growth and distribution nexus though, 
evidence for South Africa indicates that the nature of the economy’s growth path is equally 
important. Evidence for the 1995-2000 period for example, indicates that South Africa’s 
growth trajectory has not been pro-poor in nature (Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006). 
Complementary evidence indicates that South Africa’s economic growth post-1994, while 
being positive, has induced a significant maldistribution of income. The latter has been 
large enough to erode any income benefits to the poor and ultimately yielded an increase in 
national poverty levels. Hence, despite a growth in per capita expenditure between 1995 
and 2000, this growth has not been sufficiently high to offset the accompanying rise in 
inequality. Put differently, most of the gains in income through economic growth in the 
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post-apartheid period in the form of reduced poverty levels have been dissipated through 
increased income inequality.  
 
 What is interesting, overall, is the deep and organic connection between economic 
growth, which provides the resources for improving income and non-income dimensions of 
well-being, and distributional outcomes along these very dimensions, since research 
demonstrates that these distributional outcomes themselves influence the prospects for 
growth. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Five clear trends have emerged in the analysis of welfare shifts in the post-
apartheid period. These are firstly, an increase in both absolute and relative income 
poverty, when using the standard measures of poverty. Secondly there has been an increase 
in income inequality, which is notably being catalysed by a rise in the share of within-
group inequality. Thirdly, despite some employment growth, the rapid expansion of the 
labour force has resulted in increased unemployment rates irrespective of the definition 
used.  Fourthly, a large and swift fiscal resource shift has engendered widened access to 
assets and basic services to poor households. These aggregate trends are fairly consistent 
across race and gender – with the shifts amongst the African population predictably 
influencing many of the results.  One important relatively new dimension to emerge from 
the above broad trends has been the declining share of rural poverty as a consequence of 
increased migration and urbanisation.  Fifthly and finally, these changes in poverty and 
well-being in the post-1994 period have occurred within, and have influenced and had been 
influenced by, an environment of tepid economic growth rates. 
 
 The constraints on growth identified above, speak to the menu of policy options 
available to government. While ensuring that a conducive environment to realise higher 
growth is critical, this should not marginalise the issues of income vulnerability.  In this 
context, it is the nature of growth, together with growth itself, that is crucial, and the results 
on the dissipating impact of inequality on economic growth is a key result. Given South 
Africa’s severe income vulnerability, the growth-poverty-inequality nexus retains a 
particular relevance for the future. 
 
 The overview deliberately traverses a number of conceptual, research and policy 
challenges that still prevail some ten years after democracy. We hope that the rest of this 
volume expands appropriately on some of these ideas – in a bid to provide both a more 
expansive assessment of welfare issues in the post-1994 period.  We also hope that this 
volume may provide the seeds for fresh and new ideas on how this multitude of challenges 
can be dealt with in the country’s second decade of democracy. 
  
 13
References 
 
Arndt, C. & J. Lewis (2002). The Hiv/Aids Pandemic in South Africa: Sectoral Impacts and 
Unemployment. Discussion paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Benjamin, P. & Gruen, C. (2005) The Regulatory Efficiency of the Coma: A Statistical 
Analysis. Unpublished mimeo. University of the Witwatersrand:  Johannesburg. 
 
Berry et. el. (2002) The Economics of SMMES in South Africa. Working Paper: Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS). 
 
Bhorat, H. & Hodge, J. (1999) Decomposing Shifts in Labour Demand in South Africa. 
South African Journal of Economics, 67(3). 
 
Bhorat, H. (2004) Labour Market Challenges in the Post-Apartheid South Africa. South 
African Journal of Economics. 72 (5). 
 
Bhorat, H., Poswell, L. & Naidoo, P. (2004) Dimensions of Poverty in post-Apartheid 
South Africa. Development Policy Research Unit. University of Cape Town:  Cape Town. 
 
Bhorat, H. (2005) Labour Supply and Demand Constraints on Employment Creation:  A 
Microeconomic Analysis. Paper Presented to School of Development Studies 50th 
Anniversary Conference. University of KwaZulu-Natal:  Durban. 
 
Bhorat, H. and Kanbur, R. (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Bhorat, H. & Oosthuizen, M. (2006) Evolution of the Labour Market:  1995-2002 In: H. 
Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa. HSRC 
Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Bhorat, H. & Oosthuizen, M. (2006b) The Impact of Inflation on the Urban Poor in South 
Africa:  1997-2002. In: H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-
Apartheid South Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Bowles, S. & Heintz, J. (1996) Wages and Jobs in the South African Economy: An 
Econometric Investigation. Unpublished report prepared for the Presidential Labour Market 
Commission. 
 
Bureau for Economic Research (2001) The Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS in South 
Africa. Economic Research Note. 10. Stellenbosch University:  Cape Town. 
 
Casale, D., Muller, C. & Posel, D. (2004) Two Million Net New Jobs? A Reconsideration 
of the Rise in Employment in South Africa: 1995-2003. South African Journal of 
Economics. 72(5). 
 
 14
Cassim, R. et al. (2002) The State Of Trade Policy In South Africa. Trade and Industrial 
Policy Secretariat: Johannesburg. 
 
Chandra, V. (2000) Constraints to Growth and Employment in South Africa. Report 1:  
Statistics from the Large Manufacturing Survey. World Bank Discussion Paper 14. World 
Bank:  Washington. 
 
Cheadle, H. (2005) Regulated Flexibility and Small Business. Revisiting the LRA and 
BCEA. Unpublished mimeo. University of Cape Town:  Cape Town. 
 
Cichello, P., Fields, G. & Leibbrandt, M.  (2005) Earnings and Employment Dynamics for 
Africans in Post-Apartheid KwaZulu-Natal: A Panel Study of KwaZulu-Natal. Journal of 
African Economies. 14(2). 
 
Cronje, M. & Budlender, D. (2004) Comparing Census 1996 and Census 2001: An 
operational perspective, Southern African Journal of Demography, 9(1): 67–89. 
 
Demombynes, G. & Özler, B. (2006) Crime and Local Inequality in South Africa. In: H. 
Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa. HSRC 
Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2002). Growth is Good for the Poor. Journal of Economic 
Growth. 7(3).  
 
Duclos, J-Y., Sahn, D. & Younger, S. (2005) Robust Multidimensional Poverty 
Comparisons, The Economic Journal, forthcoming  
 
Edwards, L. (2001) Globalisation and the skill bias of occupational employment in South 
Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 69 (1). 
 
Edwards, L. (2006) Trade Liberalization and Labour Demand in South Africa during the 
1990s. In: H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Fallon, P. & Lucas, R. (1998) South African Labor Markets: Adjustment and Inequalities. 
Informal Discussion Paper No. 12. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Fedderke, J. W., De Kadt, R.H.J. & Luiz, J. (2003) A Capstone Tertiary Educational 
System: Inefficiency, Duplication and Inequity In South Africa’s Tertiary Education 
System, 1910-93, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27(3). 
 
Fedderke, J. (2006) From Chimera to Prospect:  Toward an Understanding of the South 
African Growth Absence. In: H. Bhorat, and R.Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-
Apartheid South Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
 15
Fields, G., Leibbrandt, M. & Wakeford, J. (1999). Key Labour Market Elasticities in South 
Africa. Department of Finance: Pretoria. 
 
Fields, G. & Kanbur, R. (2005). "Minimum Wages and Poverty", May, 2005. Cornell 
University: Ithaca 
 
Fiske, E.B. & Ladd, H.F. (2005) Elusive Equity. Education Reform in post-Apartheid South 
Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria.  
 
Foster, J. E., Greer, J. & Thorbecke, E. (1984) A Class of Decomposable Poverty Indices, 
Econometrica, 52, 761–766. 
 
Hoogeveen, J. & Özler, B. (2006) Not Separate, Not Equal:  Poverty and Inequality In 
Post-Apartheid South Africa. In: H. Bhorat and R.Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Kanbur, R. (2005) Growth, Inequality and Poverty:  Some Hard Questions.  Journal of 
International Affairs. Spring. 
 
Leibbrandt, M., Levinsohn, J. & McCrary, J. (2005) Incomes in South Africa since the fall 
of Apartheid. NBER Working Paper. No. 11384. National Bureau for Economic Research:  
Cambridge. 
 
Leibbrandt et al. (2006) Measuring Recent Changes in South African Inequality and 
Poverty. In: H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
May, J. (2006) Persistent Poverty, Asset Accumulation and Shocks in South Africa:  
Evidence from KwaZulu-Natal. In: H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Meth, C. (2006) Half-Measures:  The ANC’s Unemployment and Poverty Reduction 
Targets. In: H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Naidoo, P. & Van der Westhuizen, C. (2005) Shifts in Access to Services and Assets in 
South Africa: 1993-2004. Unpublished. Development policy Research Unit:  University of 
Cape Town. 
 
National Treasury (2004) Budget Review 2004. National Treasury of South Africa. 
Government Printer:  Pretoria.  
 
Okeahalam, C. (2002) Structure and Conduct in the Commercial Banking Sector of South 
Africa. Working Paper No. 7. Johannesburg: TIPS. 
 
 16
Oosthuizen, M. & Naidoo, P. (2004) Internal Migration to the Gauteng Province. DPRU 
Wokring Paper 04/88. Development Policy Research Unit:  University of Cape Town. 
 
Posel, D. & Casale, D. (2006) Internal Labour Migration and Household Poverty in Post-
Apartheid South Africa. In:  H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-
Apartheid South Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Rankin, N. (2005) The Regulatory Environment and SMMEs. Evidence from South African 
Firm Level Data. Unpublished mimeo. University of the Witwatersrand:  Johannesburg. 
 
Ravallion, M. and Chen, S. (2003) Measuring Pro-Poor Growth. Economic Letters 78(1): 
93-99. 
 
Rospabé, S. & Selod, H. (2006) Does City Structure Cause Unemployment?  The Case of 
Cape Town. In:  H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa. HSRC Press:  Pretoria. 
 
Simkins,C. (2003) A Critical Assessment of the 1995 and 2000 Income and Expenditure 
Surveys as Sources of Information on Incomes. University of the Witwatersrand. 
Unpublished. 
 
Small Business Project (2005) Counting the Costs of RedTape to Business in South Africa. 
Small Business Project:  Johannesburg. 
 
The Presidency (2003) Towards a Ten Year Review:  Synthesis Report on Implementation 
of Government Programmes. PCAS. Presidency of South Africa:  Pretoria. 
 
Tsikata,Y. (1999) Liberalisation and Trade Performance in South Africa. World Bank 
Informal Discussion Papers on Aspects of the South African Economy. 13. World Bank: 
Washington DC. 
 
UNAIDS (2004) 2004 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic. UNAIDS:  Geneva. 
 
Van der Berg, S. (2005) Fiscal Expenditure Incidence in South Africa, 1995 and 2000. A 
Report for the National Treasury. University of Stellenbosch:  Cape Town. 
 
Van der Berg, S. (2006) Public Spending and The Poor Since the Transition to Democracy. 
In:  H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (2006) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
HSRC Press:  Pretoria.  
 
Whiteford, A.C. & Van Seventer, D.E. (2000) South Africa's changing income distribution 
in the 1990s, Journal of Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 24(3): 7–30. 
 
World Bank (2005) World Development Indicators Database. World Bank: Washington 
DC. 
 
 17
Chapters in the Volume 
 
1. Poverty and Well-being in Post-Apartheid South Africa:  An Overview of Data, 
Outcomes and Policy 
Haroon Bhorat and Ravi Kanbur 
 
2. From Chimera to Prospect:  Toward an Understanding of the South African Growth 
Absence 
 Johannes Fedderke 
 
3. Not Separate, Not Equal:  Poverty and Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa  
 Johannes G. Hoogeveen and Berk Özler 
 
4. Measuring Recent Changes in South African Inequality and Poverty  
 Murray Leibbrandt, Laura Poswell, Pranushka Naidoo, Matthew Welch and 
Ingrid Woolard 
 
5. Evolution of the Labour Market:  1995 – 2002 
 Haroon Bhorat and Morné Oosthuizen 
 
6. Public Spending and the Poor since the Transition to Democracy 
 Servaas van der Berg 
 
7. Trade Liberalization and Labour Demand in South Africa during the 1990s 
 Lawrence Edwards 
 
8. Does City Structure Cause Unemployment?  The Case of Cape Town  
 Sandrine Rospabé and Harris Selod 
 
9. The Impact of Inflation on the Urban Poor in South Africa:  1997 – 2002 
 Haroon Bhorat and Morné Oosthuizen 
 
10. Crime and Local Inequality in South Africa 
 Gabriel Demombynes and Berk Özler 
 
11. Persistent Poverty, Asset Accumulation and Shocks in South Africa:  Evidence 
from KwaZulu-Natal 
 Julian May 
 
12. Internal Labour Migration and Household Poverty in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
 Dorrit Posel and Daniela Casale 
 
13. Half-measures:  The ANC’s unemployment and poverty reduction targets 
 Charles Meth 
 
 
 18

